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NOTES
THE NEED FOR MORE COMPREHENSIVE LABOR RELATIONS
LEGISLATION IN MONTANA
It is not the purpose of this Note to advocate any particular labor
relations laws for Montana, but to explain briefly how state labor relations
acts work, particularly in interaction with federal law, and to urge the
adoption in Montana of more comprehensive legislation than now exists.
LABOR RELATIONS LAWS IN MONTANA
There is very little legislation in Montana on the subject of regulation
of labor unions, certainly nothing comparable to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. Even without statute, however, employees have a right to organ-
ize unions, and through them, to bargain collectively with employers con-
cerning wages, hours, working conditions, or other appropriate subjects.1
Unions are considered voluntary associations of labor. As such they may
be sued in the common name of the union,' but are not subject to the anti-
trust laws of Montana, as an illegal combination in restraint of trade, when
their object is to lessen the number of hours of labor or increase wages.
Legislative policy in Montana is that labor shall not be discriminated against
by issuance of injunction on grounds which would not otherwise support
an injunction.'
The Montana Code provides that the following activities shall be illegal
on the part of the employer and thus "unfair employment practices," al-
though the Code does not use that phrase: 1. blacklisting;' 2. service let-
ters ; 3. strike breaking;' 4. interference with political activity of em-
ployees by using threats or benefits to influence their political opinions or
action.' Provisions of the Montana Code also limit the hours of labor in
specified occupations,' require employers of labor to make semi-monthly
payment of wages? and to pay due wages within seven days after the dis-
charge of an employee," and make it unlawful for employers to discriminate
between male and female employees as regards wages or other conditions of
work. '
This is the sum total of all labor ralations law in Montana.
1Brophy Coal Co. v. Matthews, 125 Mont. 212, 233 P.2d 397 (1951).
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2827; Vance v. McGinley, 39 Mont. 46, 101
Pac. 247 (1909). (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.) How-
ever, this statute does not allow a voluntary association to sue in its common
name. Doll v. Hennessy Mercantile Co., 33 Mont. 80, 86 81 Pac. 625, 626 (1905).
8R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1105.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4203 provides: "An injunction cannot be granted: ... 8. In labor
disputes under any other or different circumstances or conditions than If the con-
troversy were of another or different character, or between parties neither or none
of whom were laborers or interested in labor questions."
'R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-1309, 1310.
R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1311.
'MONT. CONST. art. III, § 31; R.C.M. 1947, § 94-3524.
OR.C.M. 1947, § 94-1424.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1101 to -1137.
"'R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1301.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1303.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1307.
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FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Congress, in order to protect interstate commerce from adverse effects
of labor disputes, has undertaken to regulate, through the use of labor
relations acts, all conduct affecting interstate commerce. The first National
Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act,' became law in 1935. It
was enacted to give greater protection to the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively, and to this end designated certain actions by em-
ployers as unfair labor practices. The Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, known as the Taft-Hartley Act," amended the Wagner Act to make
certain actions by unions unfair labor practices also.'
The original Wagner Act and the later Taft-Hartley Act are both pre-
ventive measures but are designed to give new rights rather than abolish
old ones."0 The controlling purpose of the Wagner Act was to protect in-
terstate commerce by securing to employees the right to organize, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for that and other purposes.' The act was designed
to provide methods of preventing or eliminating "unfair practices" which
long and painful experience had shown generally to lead to industrial strife,
and which obstructed or tended to obstruct interstate commerce.' Another
purpose of this act was to promote fair and just settlment of disputes by
peaceful processes and to prevent industrial warfare."
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 is designed to accomplish two primary
purposes, namely, to lessen industrial disputes and to place employers on
an equal footing with unions in bargaining and labor relations procedure.'
STATE ENACTMENTS
Some of the states have enacted state labor relations acts patterned
after the federal act and providing for complete supervision of labor rela-
tions in intrastate enterprises.' Generally speaking, such statutes are con-
"49 Stat. 449 (1935).
161 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1952).
"61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (1952).
'Annot., 123 A.L.R. 613, 627 (1939).
"NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938) ; Hughes Tool
Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Annot., 112 A.L.R. 959 (1938), 115 A.L.R.
315 (1938), 123 A.L.R. 613 (1939) ; Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 (1949).
"NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1941).
"Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954) ; NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570 (10th
Cir. 1946). The dual purpose of the act is to protect the right of employees to be
free to take concerted action as provided for in the act, and to substitute collective
bargaining for economic warfare in securing satisfactory wages, hours of work,
and employment conditions. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
It should also be mentioned that another purpose of the act was to create grievance
procedures for the benefit of the employee.
°61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141(b), 151 (1952) ; Annot., 173 A.L.R. 1402 (1948).
The declaration of purpose and policy provides: "It Is the purpose and policy of
this Act . . . to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organiza-
tions . . . to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management
which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the
rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C.
§ 141(b) (1952).
"See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) ; Wisconsin Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., 228 Wis. 473, 279 N.W. 673 (1938).
[Vol. 21,
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sidered an exercise of the police power of the state and are sustained as
constitutional, except where federal legislation under the commere clause
of the United States Constitution has pre-empted the field of labor rela-
tions law."
State labor relations acts fall into two distinct groups. The first group,
illustrated by the laws in Connecticut,' New York, ' and Rhode Island," are
patterned after the original Wagner Act and can be called "protective
laws." They affirm the right of workers to combine to better their condi-
tions and to bargain through representatives of their own free choosing,
and they safeguard this right from interference in any fashion by employ-
ers. Certain practices by employers are specifically forbidden. These in-
clude domination, assistance, or support of any labor organization; dis-
crimination in hiring and firing on the basis of union activities; refusal
to bargain with the designated representative of a majority of employees;
and other forms of interference with the right of employees to self-organ-
ization such as the circulation of black-lists and the use of threats or vio-
lence. Interpretation and application of the law are placed in the hands
of a special quasi-judicial agency, usually called a "labor relations board."
The boards are also empowered to investigate controversies concerning
representation of employees, to determine the appropriate bargaining unit,
and to certify the bargaining agent selected by a majority of employees.
Although essentially protective in nature, these laws do contain some restric-
tive provisions.
The second group, patterned after the Taft-Hartley Act, can be called
"restrictive laws." They contain most of the provisions of the protective
laws, but they also impose numerous restrictions on unions and employees
as well as on employers. They prohibit violence in labor disputes;" forbid
strikes, picketing and boycotting under certain circumstances ;" limit the
objectives of unions;" and in some cases regulate the internal affairs of
unions.' Some of these laws are administered by agencies somewhat similar
to those functioning under the protective laws; but in other states their
administration is left to the general law-enforcement officers. Included in
this "restrictive laws" group are Colorado,' Hawaii," Kansas," Massachu-
setts," Michigan," Minnesota,' Pennsylvania," Puerto Rico, Utah," and
Wisconsin."
nWisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather Co., supra note 21.
"CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-101 to -111 (1958 Rev.).
"N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 700 to 716.
"R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-7-1 to -47 (1956).
"E.g., WIS. STAT. § 111.06(2) (1957).
S'B.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-1-8(2) (1953).
"E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-802 (1955 Supp.)
"E.g., CoLO. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-22 (1953).
"CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-5-1 to -22 (1953).
"HAWAII REV. LAws §§ 90-1 to -19 (1955).
"KAN. GE. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-801 to -815 (1949).
"MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, §3 1-12 (1957).
"MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 423.1-.25 (1956 Supp.).
"MINN. STAT. §§ 179.01-.58 (1953).
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-.13 (1952).
'"PUEnTo RIco LABOR REL.ATIONs ACT, Puerto Rico Laws 1945, act 130.
"UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-1 to -34 (1953).
"Wis. STAT. §§ 111.01-.19 (1957). In 1959 Oregon repealed its labor relations act
However, this should have no bearing on the question of adoption of a Montana act
until the reasons for Oregon's action are known,
19591 NOTES
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF STATE AND FEDERAL ACTS
As stated previously, the federal acts apply to activities "affecting"
interstate commerce. Such a standard is very flexible. Today its meaning
is much clearer than it was when most of the state labor relations acts were
passed. However, there is still a marginal area in which the federal agency
may or may not have jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has said, "Wheth-
er or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and inti-
mate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and hence to lie within
the authority conferred upon the [National Labor Relations] Board; is
left by the statute to be determined as individual cases arise." More-
over, there are cases over which the National Labor Relations Board could
probably establish its jurisdiction but which, for budgetary or administra-
tive reasons, it prefers not to handle." Because the Board's work load has
increased, and because the courts have steadily expanded the Board's juris-
diction, more and more cases have fallen into this category.
Obviously, where the federal government has jurisdiction and has taken
action, the state cannot compete. A significant Supreme Court case further
established that where the federal government had jurisdiction, but had by
express rule declined to exercise it, the state was still barred from asserting
any regulatory power." The federal government had, by such compre-
hensive regulation as the National Labor Relations Act, pre-empted the
entire field of labor problems affecting interstate commerce, leaving a "no-
man's land" where within that field it declined to act. The Taft-Hartley
Act, however, pointed a way out of this undesirable impasse. It specifical-
ly authorized the National Labor Relations Board to cede this unwanted
jurisdiction to a state agency, but only where the state law was consistent
with federal law." The Supreme Court later held that this provided the
only means whereby the states could act in this area." The mere refusal
of the Board to assert its jurisdiction, for whatever reasons, was still no
authorization to the states to act without a formal cession of authority. As
a matter of fact the Board never ceded jurisdiction to any state, presumably
because the standard of consistency with federal law could not be met by
'INLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937).
"According to NLRB Release R-576, the Board, since October 2, 1958, has been
operating, generally, on the following jurisdictional yardsticks: (1) In non-retail
businesses, jurisdiction will be asserted if the yearly outflow or inflow (direct or
indirect) of goods or services in'interstate commerce is $50,000. (2) In retail
businesses, jurisdiction will be asserted if the gross yearly volume of business is
$500,000. (3) In certain other businesses such as taxicab firms, transit systems,
hotels, public utilities, newspapers, and communications systems, jurisdiction stand-
ards are set at a gross yearly volume of business in a specified amount with cer-
tain occasional modifications. (4) In businesses concerned with national defense,
jurisdiction will be asserted if there is a substantial impact on the national defense.
1 CCH LABoR LAW REP. 1610.
"Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 485 (1953).
's61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1952).
"Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters'v. Fairlawn Meats,
Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957), and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353
U.S. 26 (1957), where the Supreme Court vacated injunctions issued by state
courts enjoining practices made unlawful by the federal act.
[Vol. 21,
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any state law.' Finally, in 1959 the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act abolished this no-man's land, giving it up to the states.'
The new amendment amounts to a general cession of unexercised "jurisdic-
tion to the states. It provides that state courts and agencies may assume
'
0There was agitation on the part of state labor relations boards to have the problem
of NLRB cession of jurisdiction resolved. Various state boards met in Madison,
Wisconsin, on April 24, 1957, to discuss the problem. The agencies voted to prepare
a resolution to set forth the problem and recommend federal action. Milwaukee
Journal, April 25, 1957. However, NLRB administrative personnel, recently inter-
viewed by this writer, stated that nothing came of this and other resolutions.
4073 Stat. 519 § 701[a] provides: "Section 14 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
4(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the
opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board
shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would
assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959. (2) Nothing
in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State
or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which
the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdic-
tioo." "
In addition to this ceded jurisdiction, there has always been substantial scope
for the operation of state law. The NLRA regulates only certain activities, either
by making them unfair labor practices or by making them protected activities. 61
Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1952). By regulating activities in one of
these'two specifi6 ways, the act may not be considered as covering the entire field
since there are other activities which are neither prohibited nor protected under it.
Thus, in the unfair labor practice field the NLRA may be considered to pre-empt
the field only to the extent that the provisions of the act show, expressly or by
implication, legislative intent to pre-empt the field. Even with respect to labor dis-
putes in interstate industries, the states have been held to have the power to outlaw
injurious conduct which the NLRB is without express power to prevent and which
therefore is either governable by the states or entirely ungoverned. International
Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 254 (1949).
For examph. a state labor relations act provision making it an unfair labor
practice for employees to engage in temporary vork stoppages may lawfully be
applied to employees of an interstate employer, since the NLRA contains no cor-
responding provisions and does not pre-empt this segment of the labor field. Inter-
national Union, FAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra. On the
other hand, a state statute making the lawfulness of a strike dependent upon com-
pliance with certain requirements-notice and employee authorization-is invalid
as applied to interstate industries, since Congress indicated an intent to pre-empt
the field of strikes for higher wages by including in the NLRA certain prerequisites
of the right to strike and by outlawing some types of strikes. International Union,
UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) ; Hamilton v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 465 (6th Cir.
1947).
Common law damage suits have been held not barred by the NLRA. The U. S.
Supreme Court has ruled that jurisdiction to award damages at common law for
unlawful conduct exists in state courts even if the unlawful conduct is also an un-
fair labor practice under the NLRA. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum
Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954). See also International Union, UAW v.
Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958), where the court concluded "that an employee's
right to recover, in the state courts, all damages caused him by this kind of torti-
ous conduct cannot fairly be said to be pre-empted without a clearer declaration
of congressional policy than we find here."
Notwithstanding the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over NLRA unfair labor
practices, a state may still exercise Its inherent powers over such traditionally
local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways. Gar-
ner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United
Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
A state court can impose criminal penalties and award damages against an em-
ployer for "blacklisting" an employee in violation of state law despite the NLRA.
Pierce v. Otis Elevator Co., 331 P.2d 481 (Okla. 1958). A state may enjoin a
strike and picketing arising from a conspiracy to destroy competition In violation
5
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jurisdiction over those cases within the federal power over which the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has, by decision or published rule, declined
to assert its power."
ROLE OF STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACTS
Even though the National Labor Relations Board has broad jurisdic-
tional powers, there is, especially now, an important role the state acts may
play in the efficient handling of labor relations. As illustrations of com-
prehensive state labor relations acts there are perhaps no better examples
of protective laws than those of New York, and of restrictives laws than
those of Wisconsin. While it is not urged that Montana should adopt
identical legislation, such acts may well serve as a guidepost.
THE NEW YORK LAW"
New York conforms more closely than do most other states to the ad-
ministrative patterns established under the Wagner Act. The New York
statute is administered by a board appointed by the governor for overlap-
ping terms." The board is an independent agency so far as determination
of policy is concerned. It maintains offices in other cities, but a large
majority of its cases arise in New York City. The staff is organized into
four main divisions: The investigation division, the legal division, the gen-
eral admnistration division, and the division of trial examiners.
For purposes of discussion, procedure in a typical unfair labor prac-
tice case can be roughly divided into four phases: investigation, hearing,
posthearing, and court review.
Investigation
An unfair labor practice proceeding is initiated by the filing of a charge
by a union representative or an employee, setting forth in some detail the
of the state antitrust law. A California case held that even though interstate
commerce was affected, injunctive relief was not barred by the NLRA, since this
type of union activity was neither protected nor prohibited by that law. Lewis v.
Warehousemen's Union, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771, 330 P.2d 53 (1958).
There was a recent attempt by a state court to claim for itself some of the terri-
tory within what was the "no-man's land" of labor relations. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania stated in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Friedberg, 895
Pa. 294, 148 A.2d 909 (1959) (U.S. Supreme Court appeal docketed, No. 1026, 1958-
1959 Term; renumbered No. 140, 1959-1960 Term), that the NLRB did not have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an employer furnishing local win-
dow cleaning services, although $12,000 of the employer's $40,000 a year gross reve-
nue was derived from customers in interstate commerce. The court concluded that
the employer's interstate business was so small, trivial, and legally insignificant,
and its effect on interstate commerce so remote, that the business was outside the
scope of the NLRA under the maxim do minimis.
The Supreme Court of Washington has taken a different tack over local taxicab
firms doing a gross yearly business of $500,000. The court held that the ultimate
test of jurisdiction is not the amount of gross volume of business, but whether the
local transportation service is an integral part of interstate commerce. The court
concluded that the taxicab service was not "in commerce." State em rel. Yellow
Cab Service v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 333 P.2d 924 (Wash. 1959).
"The NLRB jurisdiction standards are set forth in note 41 8upra. It should be noted
that these yardsticks decreased the marginal area wherein federal jurisdiction is
unasserted since they are broader in scope than those employed prior to 1958.
"N.Y. LABOR LAw §§ 700 to 716 (adopted May 20, 1937).
"N.Y. LAnos LAw § 702(1).
[Vol. 21,
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acts that are alleged to constitute unfair practices.' Once a charge has
been filed, it may not be withdrawn without the permission of the board.
The charge is referred to the senior labor relations examiner, who as-
signs one of the members of his division to investigate the case. The pur-
poses of the investigation are to determine whether or not the charge can
be supported, and to attempt to bring about an amicable adjustment of
the case. The investigator usually consults separately with the individual
who filed charges and with the accused employer and then arranges a con-
ference of all the parties concerned. This conference is informal, and testi-
mony during the conference is not admissible in any later formal hearing.'
If it appears that the charge is groundless, the investigator will try to per-
suade the person or union filing the charge to withdraw it. On the other
hand, the employer may agree that the complainant has a strong case against
him, or he may even agree that he has violated the law. In such case, the
investigator will attempt to work out some settlement agreeable to the
parties and consistent with the terms of the law.
A large number of cases are settled in the first phase of the proceed-
ings by use of this informal technique. Over a period of eight and one-half
years, about nine out of ten cases have been closed before the issuance of
a formal complaint. Approximately half these cases were closed as a result
of "adjustment," which means that the employer agreed to comply with
the law without waiting for formal board action against him. The other
half of the cases closed at this stage were either withdrawn or dismissed,
which is tantamount to clearing the employer of the charges against him.'
If the charge is not disposed of by withdrawal, dismissal, or by adjust-
ment, the labor relations examiner writes a memorandum of his discussions
with the parties and recommends either that the case be dismissed or that
a formal complaint be issued. A board member rules on the recommenda-
tion and if he feels that there is prima facie evidence of a violation of the
act, he will formally authorize a complaint." Where it appears likely that
the evidence will not sustain the charges, he directs that they be dismissed.
Hearing
After the board member has authorized a complaint, the case file goes
to a litigation attorney whose job it is to draft the formal complaint. Be-
fore drafting the complaint, the litigation attorney reviews the documents
in the case, interviews potential witnesses, and, in general, supplements the
work of the labor relations examiner. This supplementary investigation
may result in a recommendation that the authorization for a complaint be
0
"N.Y.S.L.R.B. Rums. § 22 (1951). The significance of the charge has been summar-
ized by the board in the followinglanguage: "A charge constitutes neither pleading
nor proof but merely sets in motion the administrative machinery of inquiry; the
Board's complaint is not limited to matters alleged in the charge and may be broader
than the charge; the Board has not only the right but the duty, during the pendency
of proceedings before it, to investigate all unfair labor practices related to those
alleged in any charge filed with the Board or which grow out of the Board's in-
vestigation of the unfair labor practices charged, and this regardless of whether
such practices were mentioned in the original charge or any amendment thereof.
Taxi Transit Corp., Cases No. SU-9284-85, 9579 (1945).
mN.Y.S.L.R.B. REis. § 59 (1951).
'Some dismissals result from lack of jurisdiction or referral of charges to the
NLRB. The New York Board's experience is summarized in a table on pages
74-75 of its Nintth Annual Report (1945).
"N.Y. LAwoR LAW § 706(2) ; N.Y.S.L.RB. Rms. § 26 (1951).
19591 NOTES
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revoked and the charge be dismissed. Usually, however, a formal complaint
is prepared and submitted along with a notice of hearing to the associate
general counsel for signature."
Seven days' notice of hearing is required.' The hearing is generally
held before a trial examiner designated by the board and is less formal than
a court proceeding. The technical rules of evidence are not binding.'
Posthearing
After the hearing has been concluded, an "intermediate report" is
prepared." This report contains an analysis of the testimony and recom-
mended findings, conclusions, and order. It is filed with the board and
a copy given to the interested parties, who may file exceptions thereto. They
may also request an opportunity to present oral argument to the full board
in support of such exceptions. The board's copy of the report is digested
by a review attorney, presented by him to the board who then, after dis-
cussion, decides the issues of the case and instructs that a formal decision
be drafted in accordance with its instructions.'
Not, all cases in which complaints are issued and hearings held require
board decisions. Some are settled or withdrawn (with the approval of the
board) before the issuance of a decision.' The result is that during a ten
year period the New York board, after formal complaint and hearing, issued
only 410 cease and desist orders in unfair labor practice cases, although the
total of such cases closed in that period was 5,218. In other words, 92 per
cent of the cases were closed by informal methods.'
Court Review
Both parties to the case may appeal the decision of the board to the
courts.' When the board has upheld a complaint the employer is given
reasonable time to comply with the board's order, but if compliance is not
forthcoming, the board, may petition a court of general jurisdiction for en-
forcement of its order. The employer also may request the court to re-
view the order. Whenever the court takes jurisdiction of the case the en-
tire formal record is filed with the court. Thereafter, the court may enter
a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing, or setting aside the board's
order.'
The scope of the court's review is limited, however. The findings of
the board as to the facts are conclusive if supported by evidence.' The
court itself may not receive additional evidence. If it is persuaded that
such evidence is relevant and that there were reasonable grounds for failure
to bring it forth in the original hearing, the case must be remanded to the
board for the receipt of such additional evidence. The board may then
modify its findings and order." The action of the court on a petition for
"N.Y. LABOR LAW § 706(2) ; N.Y.S.L.R.B. RmGs. §§ 26, 76 (1951).
mIbid.
ON.Y. LABOR LAW § 706(2) ; N.Y.S.L.R.B. Rlms. §§ 38, 48-57 (1951).
"N.Y. LABOR LAW § 706(3) ; N.Y.S.L.R.B. R-Gs. § 60 (1951).
"N.Y. LABOR LAW § 706(3) ; N.Y.S.L.R.B. REis. §§ 60, 61 (1951).
"N.Y.S.L.R.B. Ros. § 28 (1951).
0010 N.Y.S.L.R.B., ANNUAL REPORT table III, app. A (194).
"N.Y. LABOR LAW § 707(4) (1951).
ON.Y. LABOR LAW § 707(1), (4) (1951).
6N.Y. LABOR LAW § 707(2) (1951).
"Ibid.
[Vol. 21,
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enforcement or review may be appealed by any interested party (including
the board) to the appellate division and thence to the court of appeals. '
If the employer fails to obey the court's decree enforcing the order of the
board, he is subject to the usual penalties for contempt.'
Jurisdictional Problems of the New York Board
Because the New York State Labor Relations Board has handled more
cases than any other state board and because many of the country's im-
portant industries are located in that state, it is there that possibilties of
conflict with the federal authority are greatest. There have been few in-
stances of conflicting orders, or even of concurrent pleading involving the
New York and the federal boards. This lack of conflict results primarily
from an agreement reached between the two agencies in 1937. The essence
of the agreement is set forth in a footnote.'
Throughout the period of expanding jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board the jurisdictional lines between the two agencies remained
as originally drawn. The success of this arrangement seems attributable
to the following factors: amicable relations were established between the
personnel of the two boards at the outset; both boards had so many cases
to handle that the marginal ones were not important enough to struggle
for; the New York law and the pre-1947 National Labor Relations Act were,
with some minor exceptions, practically identical, so that litigants would
gain nothing by seeking the services of one board rather than those of the
other.
What effect section 10a of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act amendment will have on the agree-
ment between the two boards remains to be seen.
WISCONSIN
Wisconsin adopted a labor relations act in 1937. ' The Wisconsin act,
like the National Labor Relations Act, listed unfair practices of employers
but not of unions. The unfair employer practices included interference
with the employees' right to organize, sponsorship or control of a union,
refusal to bargain with the representatives of the union, discrimination
against union membership through hiring or job-tenure policies, and black-
listing or spying upon employees.'
The law created a Wisconsin Labor Relations Board, with power to
decide the appropriate bargaining unit, to conduct elections, to determine
"N.Y. LABOR LAW § 707(3) (1951).
"Matter of Boland (Parisi), 4 CCH LABoR CASES 60.490 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co., N.Y.
1941).6
"Unless there are unusual circumstances, the New York State Labor Relations
Board will assume jurisdiction over all cases arising in the following trades and
industries, without clearing, except as a matter of record, with the National Board's
officials: 1. Retail stores, 2. Small industries which receive all or practically all
raw materials from within the State of New York, and do not ship any material
proportion of their product outside the State, 3. Service trades (such as laundries),
4. Office and residential buildings, 5. Small and clearly local public utilities, (this
includes local traction companies, as well as gas and electric light corporations),
6. Storage warehouses, 7. Construction operations, 8. Other obviously local busi-
nesses." Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NYSLRB, 330 U.S. 767, 795 (1947) (concurring
opinion).
'Wis. Laws 1937, ch. 51.
'Wis. Laws 1937, ch. 51, § 111.08.
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the bargaining agent for the employees, to list bona fide unions and deny
listing to company unions, to make investigations, to hold hearings, to pre-
vent unfair labor practices, and to act as a conciliation and voluntary arbi-
tration agency." The Wisconsin act was generally similar to the National
Labor Relations Act. One difference was the provision for conciliation and
arbitration. Another was that the Wisconsin employer could grant a closed
shop agreement without evidence that the union represented a majority
of the employees or even any of them. A unique feature of the Wisconsin
act was the requirement that unions be listed with the board, thus provid-
ing employers the names of bona fide labor organizations with which they
might deal.
In its two-year period of operation, the board proved to be the most
successful mediation and arbitration agency which the state had ever estab-
lished. It intervened in practically every strike which occurred. In 1938
and 1939 the downward trend of strikes in Wisconsin was sharper than in
the rest of the nation.' It settled 680 labor controversies by mediation.
Of 63 voluntary arbitration cases received, it arbitrated 13, mediated 12,
and appointed arbitration committees in 37."
In handling cases concerning unfair labor practices the board tried to
function as far as possible without formal complaints, trials, and decisions.
Of 425 charges of unfair labor practices filed, the board issued complaints
in only 75 cases and rendered decisions in 28." The board's procedure was
first to investigate and attempt to adjust the difficulty. If the violation
was denied or not corrected, the board charged the employer with a gpeciifc
violation. If he did not agree to correct the practice, a subsequent hearing
was scheduled at which attorneys usually represented the complainant and
the employer. "'
The board received 117 applications from unions for listing. Forty-six
were accepted, 45 denied, and 26 dismissed. Unions affiliated with the
CIO or the AF of L were listed as a matter of course. Unaffiliated unions
were not listed until a public hearing had been held to determine their in-
dependence from the employer."5 Elections were conducted in 59 cases and
unions were certified in 46 of them. In 16 cases the board informally de-
termined the bargaining agent."
The board made no distinction between interstate and intrastate com-
merce in deciding to take jurisdiction but it withdrew in cases where the
National Labor Relations Board had chosen to act. There was a regular
clearance of information between the state and national boards and co-
operation was excellent."
The basic criticism of the Wisconsin act was that it did not list unfair
union practices. It should be noted that the National Labor Relations Act
was also criticized in this respect. It was felt that there was little need for
a list of unfair union practices because the employer ordinarily had free-
dom of action and because in the past the balance of bargaining power had
7 Wis. Laws 1937, ch. 51, §§ 111.06, .09, .10, .12, .13, .15, .16.
"HAFmBKBEC , WIscoNsiN LABOR LAws 164 (1958).
"Wis. LABOR REL. BD. REPORT 1.
"Id. at 26.
"Note 72 supra.
75Ibid.
"Ibid.
"Note 72 supra at 164, 165.
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been on the side of the employer. Another objection was that the law did
not permit an employer to petition for an election to determine a bargain-
ing agent, a deficiency which appeared also in the Wagner Act.
The act was abolished in 1939 and replaced by the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Peace Act partly because of the criticisms mentioned above, but prob-
ably more largely because of a change in public opinion toward unions.
The Wisconsin Employment Peace Act of 1939"
The abolition of the 1937 act was the result of a new trend developed
in state labor legislation. The "protective laws" were replaced or amend-
ed to provide for restrictions on union rights and activities. There was
widespread legislative concern for protection of the rights of employers, in-
dividual workers, and the public.
The stated purpose of the new law was to protect the interests of the
public, the employee, and the employer." Some of its features were similar
to those of the 1937 act. The new board had the power to act in mediation
and voluntary arbitration cases, to conduct hearings and issue cease and
desist orders in unfair labor practice cases, and to conduct representation
elections. There were some significant additions to the list of unfair em-
ployer practices. An employer could not bargain with the representatives
of less than a majority of his employees in a collective bargaining suit.
Union-shop agreements were forbidden unless three-fourths or more of the
employees in the bargaining unit approved. Deduction of union dues or
assessments from an employee's pay was forbidden unless the employee had
authorized such a deduction in writing.'
A major feature of the law was a list of unfair employee practices.81
A detailed financial report of the union was required to be presented an-
nually to each member of the union.'
The Wisconsin board, like the National Labor Relations Board, con-
ducts elections to determine whether the employees wish to designate a
union as bargaining agent, and if so, which union is to be so used. In the
year ending June 30, 1956, the board conducted 95 elections; unions were
certified in 69 of these.'
The disposition of unfair labor practice complaints by employees and
employers is an important part of the board's work. The chief employer
violations were discrimination in hiring, tenure, or employment conditions;
interference with and coercion of employees in the exercise of the right to
organize and bargain collectively; refusal to bargain with the representative
of a majority of the employees; and contract violations. Where the viola-
tions have been proven the board has required the employer to remedy the
situation by such action as reinstating employees and paying them for any
wage loss suffered as a result of discrimination, notifying the union of a
willingness to bargain, and other appropriate action as deemed necessary.
"WIs. STAT. §§ 111.01-.19 (1957).
"WIs. STAT. § 111.01 (1957).
WIs. STAT. §§ 111.03, .05, .07, .10, .11 (1957).
'Wis. STAT. § 111.06 (1957). Compare with § 8 of the NLRA as amended in
1947. One could conclude that the Wisconsin Assembly anticipated the Taft-Hartley
Act in respect to unfair employee practices.
'Wis. STAT. § 111.08 (1957).
'WIS. EMPL. Rm. BD., ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1955-56).
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The table in a footnote summarizes the number of these cases and other
board activities.
The principal employee unfair labor practices have been coercion or
intimidation of employers or of individual employees in the enjoyment of
their legal rights, secondary boycotts, illegal picketing, and contract viola-
tions. '
The Wisconsin board is very active in mediation and arbitration pro-
ceedings. Since 1945 it has handled about 150 cases a year. In the year
ending June 30, 1956, the board closed 104 of 109 mediation cases received.
In 15 of these cases the employer asked for assistance; in 76 the unions re-
quested the board's assistance; in 12 there was a joint request; and in one
case the board took the initiative. In 99 of the cases agreement was reached
between the parties. In the same year the board received 27 voluntary
arbitration cases and settled 23.8'
Jurisdictional relations with the NAtional Labor Relations Board have
been a continuing problem for the Wisconsin board as well as for similar
boards in other states. The 1937-39 board cooperated closely with the
National Labor Relations Board and regularly exchanged information on
current cases. The new board assumed that its jurisdiction was similar to
that of its predecessor, but more conflicts developed because state law dif-
fered sharply from the federal law.'m
This conflict became more acute after the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, which provided that before there could be a cession of federal jurisdic-
tion the state law had to be consistent with the federal act. ' Though not a
formal cession of jurisdiction, after the National Labor Relations Board
adopted its jurisdictional standards in 1954, it approved extension by the
Wisconsin board of its jurisdiction to such cases as the federal board would
"WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD: CASES RECEIVED, 1939-57*
Employee Represen- Referen- Arbitra-
Fiscal All or Union Employer tation dum Mediation tion
Year Cases Violations Violations Cases Cases Cases Cases
1939-40 185 23 29 48 21 56 8
1940-41 348 21 32 101 121 66 7
1941-42 273 5 34 66 80 79 9
1942-43 109 3 19 23 34 24 6
1943-44 187 1 27 75 75 6 3
1944-45 163 3 25 56 75 0 4
1945-46 343 13 33 109 172 12 4
1946-47 480 19 53 160 193 49 6
1947-48 596 11 46 144 215 165 7
1848-49 595 16 42 63 261 181 17
1949-50 529 25 57 96 188 135 15
1950-51 661 33 44 131 279 147 27
1951-52 429 12 23 59 191 122 22
1952-53 543 21 39 96 190 177 20
1953-54 420 14 28 78 148 127 25
1954-55 436 9 42 119 136 110 20
1955-56 473 13 26 119 179 109 27
1956-57 458 6 35 116 184 89 28
*Data from annual reports of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 1939-57.
Totals for the fiscal years 1947-48, 1948-49, and 1949-50 include 36 cases received in
those years under the public utility law.
"Comment, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 136.
8'Wis. EMPL. REL. BD., ANNUAL REPORT 27-28,35 (1955-56).
8' HAFERBECK, WIscONsIN LAiBo LAws 172 (1958).8'61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952). See also note 43 supra.
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not accept. This promised to be a satisfactory working arrangement until
Supreme Court holdings made clear that the state was barred from acting
in the absence of an actual cession of jurisdiction.' The new Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act, however, now operates as a general
cession to the states of jurisdiction in cases outside the self-imposed juris-
dictional standards of the National Labor Relations Board.'
JUSTIFICATION FOR A STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACT
IN MONTANA
The various state acts, in their declarations of policy, recognize the
following major interests: public welfare and industrial peace, and equal-
ity of bargaining power between and among employers and employees.
More specifically, the justifications for state labor legislation can be sum-
marized as follows: 1. State legislation will set forth a body of law ap-
plicable to purely intrastate labor relations cases. 2. State agencies, which
are closer to the local conditions, may be able to handle a problem with
greater flexibility and discretion than the National Labor Relations Board.
3. State labor agencies may be capable of handling labor problems more
expeditiously than a federal administrative body. 4. The fifty states serve
as "laboratories" for testing progressive labor measures.' 5. Local respon-
sibility is closer to the American ideal of self-determination. 6. The state
board could assume jurisdiction in cases involving interstate commerce
where the federal board has declined to act.
The reasons advanced generally for state labor relations legislation ap-
ply to Montana. Montana's total labor force numbered 230,143 on April
1, 1950, the date of the last census, with a definite shift from agricultural
to nonagricultural occupations. The trade and service industries are the
ranking sources of employment after agriculture. Manufacturing is also
expandingY
With this increase of nonagricultural wage earners, there is an increas-
ing need for moro labor relations law. Cofiflicts between labor and capital
have arisen and will continue to arise within the state. In order to meet
these problems adequate legislation is necessary. Montana is no longer the
agricultural state it was twenty-five years ago. Industry, fast becoming
"Note 44 supra.
'Note 46 supra.
"In many fields of legislation, particularly In matters affecting labor, the states have
often served as testing laboratories for proposals later adopted by the federal gov-
ernment. In the matter of labor relations law the federal government was first in
the field, but this fact has by no means precluded fruitful state experimentation.
None of the state laws merely copied all the provisions of the Wagner Act. Even
those states that adopted the protective policy made some significant departures
from the federal legislation. The craft-unit proviso, the statutory employer petition,
separation of investigation and prosecution, and combination of general mediation
and law enforcement are some of the provisions tried out by these states. The re-
strictive state laws have put into operation more fundamental departures from both
the substantive and the procedural provisions of the Wagner Act. In virtually all
states there has also been experimentation with administrative practices different
from those of the federal board. Many of these state variations have been embodied
in the new federal labor relations act, and others have been proposed for adoption
by the federal government. The experience of the states with these variations pro-
vides a basis for considering their probable import.
m'MONTANA ALMANAC (1959-1960) 185-195 (1958).
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the largest consumer of Montana's labor force, must have the proper leg-
islative machinery for its continued growth.
Aside from the justifications for state labor relations legislation men-
tioned above, such legislation should also contemplate the following objec-
tives: (1) resolution of the difficulties which plague the courts when they
are called upon to identify the nature of the legal relations created by a
collective bargaining agreement,' (2) solidification of the legal status of
arbitration clauses under the collective bargaining agreement," (3) regu-
lation of certain collusive, coercive and corrupt practices of employers and
unions,' and (4) elimination of piecemeal legislation."
CONCLUSION
Generally stated, whatever the public policy that prevails, there is
clearly a place for comprehensive state labor relations legislation. Many
employers and employees are outside the scope of the federal law and often
need the services of a state employment relations board. Even with the
broadest possible extension of federal jurisdiction under the Constitution,
many millions of workers would remain outside the federal act's jurisdic-
tion. And even within the present jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board there are important segments of industry over which it does
not assert authority and which are now subject to state regulation.
BRUCE D. CRIPPEN
"The various views as to the nature of a collective bargaining agreement are noted
in Cox, CASES ON LABOR L&w 751, n.36 (1958).
"For an interesting discussion of this subject see Cox, op. cit. supra note 93, at 764.
",ee 4A CCH LABOR LAw REP., N.M. 43,801, N.Y. 43,801.
"Montana Legislative Summary, 20 MONT. L. Rav. 156 (1959).
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